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Abstract
This paper makes three contributions to the literature on the effects of collective
bargaining on the performance of German establishments. We include the anal-
ysis of firms’ efficiency and we model productivity and efficiency simultaneously.
Confronted with 25 % observations with missing values, we check the missing data
mechanisms and find effects of firm size and collective bargaining on it, among oth-
ers. After proper multiple imputation of the missing values – thus avoiding obvious
nonresponse bias –, the results on the collective bargaining effects on productivity
and efficiency change significantly. Finally, we suggest to multiply impute implau-
sible zero values in the capital proxy as well.
Keywords: Collective bargaining, efficiency and productivity, establishment data,
missing data, multiple imputation
JEL codes: C15, C24, C81, D24, J50
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1 Introduction
The effects of collective bargaining on wages and firm performance have received a great
deal of interest. It is generally accepted among economists that collective bargaining has
a positive influence on the wages that are negotiated. On the other hand, the impact on
firm performance, e.g., productivity, is not yet resolved. In the highly related literature
on collective bargaining, unions or works councils (see Addison et al. (2004) for a recent
survey), some authors stress the positive influence of unions on productivity due to work-
ers’ higher motivation and satisfaction leading to higher effort, lower turnover costs and
more investment in firm-specific human capital. Other authors emphasize the reduced
flexibility and power of managers leading to lower productivity. The total effect of col-
lective bargaining is an open empirical question (see e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004,
p. 424).
Many papers have been written on the effects of collective bargaining on productiv-
ity whereas its effect on firms’ efficiency is mostly ignored. In our opinion it is highly
important to do this with a proper (simultaneous) stochastic frontier model for firms’
productivity and efficiency. Until the beginning of this decade, the so-called ‘2-step ap-
proach’ has been employed quite often in the frontier literature: the inefficiency estimates
from the first step (estimation of productivity with the frontier) were used to find some
inefficiency determinants in a second step. But Wang and Schmidt (2002) have shown
that this procedure can lead to severely biased results. It is preferable to model productiv-
ity and efficiency simultaneously in one step, following, e.g., Reifschneider and Stevenson
(1991).
In particular, we are not aware of any study with German data suitably analyzing
this aspect of firm performance. International differences in judicial systems, culture,
etc. impede the application of empirical results on the effects of collective bargaining
from one country to the other. Addison et al. (2003), analyzing the effects of German
works councils, are an exception. But they apply the 2-step approach criticized above.
Thus, the first contribution of this paper is to analyze the effect of collective bargaining
on productivity and efficiency with the suitable tool, i.e., stochastic production frontiers
in the 1-step approach, and German establishment data.
When analyzing the data set, we were confronted with missing values, a typical sit-
uation in empirical research. A closer look to the data revealed 4 % to 15 % of missing
values particularly in the most important variables: output, capital and labor. The typi-
cal reaction – e.g., in Schank (2005), Addison et al. (2003) or Jensen (2001, p. 158ff) – to
this problem is to include only those observations with no missing values on all relevant
variables, i.e., to ignore all the records that have missing values. But ignoring them usu-
ally would reduce the complete data records available considerably. Whereas information
from 18447 observations from the panel waves of 2002 and 2003 is available in principle,
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only 13969 observations of them can be used when inference is based only on the complete
cases. Furthermore, ignoring missing values is based on very strong assumptions about
the missing data mechanism. The question arises whether this item-nonresponse occurs
randomly, i.e., whether the remaining data are still representative for the population of
interest. If not, the resulting test statistics are no longer valid and the resulting estimates,
e.g., on the influence of collective bargaining on productivity and efficiency, will, at least,
be less efficient but probably also be biased. Although 13969 observations seem to be ‘a
lot’ they are ‘not enough’ if some observations are systematically missing – just to refute
a standard argument for ignoring missing data.
Biases can be expected to occur particularly in the establishment’s inefficiency esti-
mates of the stochastic production frontier. Because frontier estimates depend on the
extreme efficient establishments in the sample and because the inefficiency estimates are
derived from the estimation residuals, the latter are extremely sensitive to any kind of
misspecification in the model – see, e.g., Jensen (2005). Therefore, the second contribu-
tion of this paper is to demonstrate the dangers of ignoring missing data or the gains of
properly imputing them when analyzing effects (of collective bargaining) on productivity
and efficiency. Ko¨lling and Ra¨ssler (2004) also applied stochastic frontiers to multiply
imputed data and found interesting differences but they used the model by Battese and
Coelli (1995) and they did not focus on the effects of collective bargaining. The latter also
goes for the purely explorative paper by Jensen and Ra¨ssler (2006). We finally believe
that most studies with German data found no productivity effects of German unions –
see the survey in Schnabel (1991) – because they ignored systematically missing data.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, the stochastic production
frontier model is introduced. The following section presents the data. Section 4 analyzes
the response behavior and the missing data mechanisms and gives a short introduction
to multiple imputation. In the fifth section, the estimation results for the different ap-
proaches are given and compared. Finally, section 6 summarizes the paper.
2 Stochastic production frontiers
This section summarizes the theory on stochastic production frontiers necessary in the
following.
In microeconomic theory, economic production functions provide maximum possible
output for given inputs of, say, n firms in the sample. In reality, inefficient input use may
lead to lower outputs for many firms. Therefore, frontier functions (lying on top of the
data cloud) have been developed for estimating potential output and inefficiency.
After the seminal work of Aigner and Chu (1968), Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen
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and van den Broeck (1977) introduced the stochastic production frontier
Yi = exp(β0) ·
k∏
j=1
X
βj
ij · exp(vi) · TEi, i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
or in logs
yi = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjxij + ei, ei = vi − ui, ui ≥ 0. (2)
The functional form in (1) is Cobb-Douglas. In order to avoid the well-known hard re-
strictions of this function, we have chosen the rather general translog production function
in the estimation.
In (2), yi is the output (in logs), xij are k inputs (all in logs) of firm no. i, and βj are
unknown parameters. Then, with TEi = 1 or ui = 0,
Y ∗i = exp(β0) ·
k∏
j=1
X
βj
ij · exp(vi) or y∗i = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjxij + vi (3)
is maximum possible output for given inputs. The output ratio
0 ≤ TEi = exp(−ui) = Yi
Y ∗i
≤ 1 (4)
is interpreted as technical inefficiency of firm no. i. Finally, the composed error term
ei consists of the one-sided inefficiency term ui and the symmetric part vi representing
statistical noise. xij, vi and ui are assumed to be independent with the distributional
assumptions
vi ∼ N(0, σ2v) and ui ∼ N+(µ, σ2u) (5)
where N+(·, ·) stands for a normal distribution truncated at u = 0 (see Stevenson, 1980).
The choice of the truncated normal distribution in (5) contains the half-normal distri-
bution as (testable) special case. Other tractable alternatives for the inefficiency distribu-
tion are the exponential and the gamma distribution. Ritter and Simar (1997) have shown
the bad performance of the gamma distribution. Jensen (2005) has presented some risks
of working with exponentially distributed inefficiency. Therefore, we prefer the truncated
normal distribution.
The log-likelihood function is l(β, σ, λ, µ) =
−n
[
ln(σ) + const+ ln
(
Φ
(−µ
σλ
))]
−
n∑
i=1
[
1
2
(
ei
σ
)2
− ln
(
Φ
(−µ
σλ
− −eiλ
σ
))]
(6)
with
λ =
σu
σv
and σ2 = σ2v + σ
2
u (7)
and the standard normal distribution function Φ(·). Iterative maximization leads to
consistent and asymptotically efficient maximum likelihood (ML) estimators βˆj, σˆ, λˆ and
µˆ.
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How can the inefficiency terms be estimated? Since, in a stochastic frontier model,
the estimation residuals only estimate the composed error e and not u, the inefficiencies
must be estimated indirectly with the help of the minimum mean-squared error predictor
E[ui|ei] = σλ
1 + λ2
 φ
(
eiλ
σ
)
Φ
(
− eiλ
σ
) − eiλ
σ
 (8)
with the standard normal density function φ(·).
This basic approach might be too restrictive. Independence of xij and ui may be a
hard assumption as heteroscedasticity might occur. Despite the iid assumption (5), u
might still contain some structure. Until the beginning of this decade, the so-called ‘2-
step approach’ has been employed quite often: the inefficiency estimates from (8) – the
first step – were used to find some inefficiency determinants in a second step. But Wang
and Schmidt (2002) have shown that this procedure – claiming that ui are iid in the first
step and finding structure in them in the second step – can lead to severely biased results.
Therefore, it is advisable to use a ‘1-step approach’, e.g., the procedure already pre-
sented by Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991). They allow the inefficiency terms ui to
depend on some explanatory variables zij (interpreted as sources of inefficiency) which
may be partly identical with variables xij:
ui = δ0 +
l∑
j=1
δjzij + wi = di + wi, i = 1, . . . , n (9)
δj are unknown parameters. The distributional assumptions are
vi ∼ N(0, σ2v), ui ∼ N+(di, σ2u) and wi ∼ trunc−diN(0, σ2w) (10)
where trunc−diN(·, ·) stands for a normal distribution truncated at w = −di. The ML
estimators βˆj, δˆj, σˆ and λˆ can now be derived simultaneously using iterative ML tech-
niques. See the given references for the likelihood function of the full model. Coelli et
al. (1998), Greene (1997) or Jensen (2001) present more details on frontiers.
3 Data
3.1 General description
Our data are taken from two waves (2002 and 2003) of the Establishment Panel of the In-
stitute for Employment Research of the Federal Labor Service (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt-
und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, IAB). The basis for the panel is the
employment statistics register of the Federal Labor Service covering all dependent employ-
ment in the private and public sector and accounting for almost 85% of total employment
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in Germany. The survey unit of the register is the establishment or local production unit,
rather than the legal and commercial entity of the company.
The IAB Establishment Panel draws a stratified random sample of units from the
register, the selection probabilities depend on the number of employees in the respec-
tive stratum. The strata comprise some 20 industries and 10 establishment size intervals
covering all sectors and employment levels. The overall and size-specific response rates
including firms that are interviewed for the first time exceed 60 percent, and, for repeat-
edly interviewed establishments, more than 80 percent. As usual, we do not have exact
information about the reasons for unit-nonresponse in the data. It is commonly assumed
that next to the general attitude to take part in a survey there are two main reasons
for nonresponse. First, there are questions that are too difficult to understand or the
information wanted is not easily available and, second, there are questions that concern
sensitive information. In both cases, the interviewee is not willing to participate in the
panel. A study for earlier waves of the panel comes to the result that only a few items
influence the willingness of firms to participate significantly (see Hartmann and Kohaut,
2000).
The first wave of the establishment panel in 1993 contained data on 4,265 estab-
lishments. Since 1993 the panel has been augmented regularly to reflect establishment
mortality, other exits, and newly-founded units. In 1996 a panel was initiated for eastern
Germany with an initial sample of 4,313 establishments. Currently, the overall number of
establishments in the sample approximates 15,000 with the addition of eastern Germany
and other regional samples. The panel is designed to meet the needs of the Federal Em-
ployment Agency, so that its focus is again on employment-related matters - although its
scope is wider than the parent register. Much of the information in the panel concerns
worker characteristics and qualifications as well as levels of and changes in establishment
employment. There is also information on the training and further training of employees,
working time, and overtime. Additionally, information on certain establishment policies,
business developments, and investment is similarly collected on an annual basis. Other
information is collected biennially or triennially. Up to our knowledge this Establish-
ment Panel is the best and most comprehensive panel survey of firms, companies, and
organizations in Germany; for more details see http://betriebspanel.iab.de/.
3.2 Definition of central variables
This subsection documents the measurement of the central variables, i.e., output, capital,
labor, and collective bargaining.
Output is measured as value added (see the appendix on variable construction for ex-
act definitions). We excluded all establishments from the sample that do not use turnover
as output measure. This affects non-profit organisations, public offices, banks and in-
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surances. In the imputed data-sets, 3 distinct outliers in the output variable had to be
eliminated because – particularly with a frontier function – they would significantly bias
the estimates.
A reasonable measure for labor input should take into account skill and productivity
differences between employees, among others. For labor, the data set provides two possible
approximations: full-time equivalents (total number of employees minus 0.5 times total
number of part-time employees) or earnings. The first choice would implicitly assume, e.g.,
that all employees are equally skilled and productive whereas the second choice implicitly
assumes that earnings are a good proxy for skills and productivity, among others. We
decided for the latter because that assumption seems to be more reasonable as well as
seems to lead to better results, particularly in the inefficiency sub-model.
The capital variable is notorious for the difficulties any approximation to the latent
value of the capital stock causes in the estimation. With time series data, the capital
variable approximated by the perpetual inventory method often shows low variation and
non-stationarity. In this paper, with cross-sectional data covering two years, we decided
to proxy capital by the replacement investment in the current year. Of course, this choice
implicitly assumes that capital is replaced uniformly and sufficiently, among others. An
alternative would be to approximate capital by the average replacement investment of,
say, 4 years – like e.g. Schank (2005, p. 701) – or 2 years like Addison et al. (2003, p. 14).
But, due to the well-known problem of panel attrition, this approximation would lead to
the exclusion of many firms: Of those establishments participating in the panel in 2003,
only 75 % participated in 2002, only 61 % in 2001 and only 50 % in 2000. So, proceeding
like Schank would eliminate 50 % of the observations, proceeding like Addison et al. still
25 %! Moreover, according to the information presented in the following subsection, it is
obvious that these observations are not eliminated randomly and even more nonresponse
bias may be introduced then. Therefore, we decided to proxy capital by the replacement
investment in the current year, despite some possible discontinuities.
In the following subsection, we will show that replacement investment is one of the
variables suffering from many missing values. This problem will be soothed by multiple
imputation. But another problem is that a large part (7888 of 18447) of the values on
investment in the sample are reported as being zero. Addison et al. (2003, p. 14) notice this
problem, too. Their reaction is to exclude all establishments reporting zero replacement
investment in both years t and t − 1 from the sample in year t. This technique reduces
their sample again by 17 %!
Of course, it can occur that small establishments do not transact any replacement
investments during a whole year. But it does not make any sense to assume that the
latent value of the capital stock is zero. And eliminating those observations would once
again systematically change the sample and possibly lead to another nonresponse bias
(see the following subsection). Additionally, there is some unproven suspicion that many
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of these firms are simply not able or not willing to provide exact non-zero investment
numbers. Therefore, a third contribution of our paper is the suggestion to multiply
impute these zeroes as well. We are aware of the strong assumptions our suggestion is
based on. But the alternatives, i.e.
• taking the average replacement investment of n years (see above)
• assuming the latent value of the capital stock to be zero (see above)
• eliminating the observations with capital zeroes (see the following subsection)
are not more attractive. That is why, in section 5, we will compare the estimation results
of three alternative procedures. Notice finally that the imputations are all done in one
step. We do not perform a two-step imputation and, therefore, we can still use the usual
pooling formulae to get the multiple imputation estimates.
The dummy variable representing the existence of collective agreements for the re-
spective establishment is 1 if an industry pay agreement is effective for the establishment
or if the establishment aligns its wages to an industry pay agreement.
After these fundamental decisions, the covariates of labor and capital in the production
function and the inefficiency determinants in sub-model (9) had to be selected from the
variables available in the IAB Establishment Panel and suggested by diverse economic
theories. It is well-known that forward and backward variable selection procedures can
lead to very different results when the regressors are correlated. Therefore, we conducted a
very detailed data analysis including a factor analysis to examine the correlation structure
of the regressors. Then, in a large-scale model selection procedure combining several
forward and backward runs (using both the imputed data and only the observed data),
the final sets of variables for the production function and the sub-model were fixed. Every
variable had several opportunities to enter the production function and the sub-model.
A variable is included in all regressions if it was significant in at least one of the 11
regressions (5 + 5 auxiliary regressions with imputed data and one with only the observed
data). The appendix on variable construction shows the exact definitions of all variables
and the tables show the use of the variables.
4 Item-nonresponse and imputation
4.1 Item-nonresponse
After the application of the restrictions described in the previous section, 9462 establish-
ments remain in the sample. Since not all establishments participated in both years, there
are 18447 data records for 2002 and 2003. Multiple imputation, described in the remain-
der of this section, is able to preserve this sample size. On the other hand, only 13969
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observations can be used when inference is based only on the complete cases without any
item-nonresponse on the variables used in this study.
Item-nonresponse in the data is mainly found in few variables, particularly those used
to construct output, labor and capital. Table 1 gives the variables in the questionnaire
with the highest item-nonresponse rates. All the other variables used in our study are
distinctly below the rates shown there.
The application of the multiple imputation procedure requires some assumptions on
the nonresponse mechanism. Therefore we analyzed the probability for item-nonresponse
with a Probit model (see, e.g., Greene, 2003) first, according to
P (yi = 1|xi) = Φ(xiβ) (11)
with the normal distribution function Φ(·). We did this in two ways: The endogenous
binary variable y = MISS is one if item-nonresponse occurs. The endogenous binary vari-
able y = MISS0 is one if item-nonresponse occurs or if the capital variable is zero (see the
previous section). We used the same exogenous variables xj as in the frontier estimation
described later (see the appendix on variable construction for exact definitions) except
output, capital and labor – of course – because they are affected by item-nonresponse.
We added the log of the number of employees as measure of firm-size. All variables with
|t| values less than 1.0 were eliminated.
Table 2 provides the results. For better interpretation, we do not show the parameter
estimates but the marginal effects
∂E(yi)
∂xij
=
∂Φ(xiβ)
∂xiβ
βj = φ(xiβ)βj (12)
with the standard normal density function φ(·). For metric exogenous variables, the
marginal effects are evaluated at the mean. For exogenous dummy variables dj, they are
calculated by
Φ(xiβ|di = 1)− Φ(xiβ|di = 0) (13)
Marginal effects with absolute values less than 0.00005 are not shown.
Table 2 shows that many variables in the data-set have a significant influence on the
probability for item-nonresponse. E.g., an establishment with one unit higher log of the
number of employees (as proxy for firm-size) shows roughly 2 % lower probability for item-
nonresponse (ceteris paribus and on average). And an establishment where an industry
pay agreement is effective or which at least aligns its wages to an industry pay agreement
has roughly 4 % lower probability for item-nonresponse than an establishment without
any industry pay agreement effects. Most absolute marginal effects and absolute t values
decrease in the Probit model for MISS0 (item-nonresponse or capital zeroes) but the main
results remain valid. Among others, we also see that item-nonresponse rates are lower for
establishments with relatively
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• much paid overtime (a proxy for high labor utilization)
• high technical condition
• and many high-skilled employees
This means that by ignoring missing data we are systematically reducing the share of
establishments in the sample with smaller size, low degree of labor utilization, low techni-
cal condition, few high-skilled employees and no industry pay agreement effects. And this
means particularly that we are not able to declare (without closer analysis) that ignoring
missing data will have no influence on the estimated effects of collective bargaining on the
productivity and efficiency of the establishments in the sample. Therefore, one should try
a proper imputation technique to fill the missing values and allow the use of all valuable
information that is observed.
4.2 Missing data mechanism
First formalized by Rubin (1976), in modern statistical literature (see Little and Rubin
1987, 2002, p. 12) the missing data mechanisms are commonly distinguished according
to the probability of response yielding the following three cases:
• The missing data are said to be missing completely at random (MCAR), if the
nonresponse process is independent of both unobserved and observed data.
• If, conditional on the observed data, the nonresponse process is independent only
of the unobserved data, then the data are missing at random (MAR). This is the
case, e.g., if the probability of answering the turnover question varies according to
the size of the company, and the size is observed.
• Finally, data are termed not missing at random (NMAR), if the nonresponse process
depends on the values of the variables that are actually not observed. This might
be the case for turnover reporting, where companies with higher turnover tend to
be less likely to report their turnover.
In the context of likelihood-based inference and when the parameters describing the
measurement process are functionally independent of the parameter describing the non-
response process, MCAR and MAR are said to be ignorable; otherwise we call it non-
ignorable missingness which is the hardest case to deal with analytically because the
missingness mechanism has to be modeled itself.
As mentioned above, the highest amount of missing values occurs in the most impor-
tant variables for production function estimation: output, capital and labor. The Probit
analysis of item-nonresponse in the previous subsection shows that the assumption of
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MCAR obviously is violated but, fortunately, we seem to find good predictors of the non-
response behavior. Therefore, we assume that the missing values of the variables used in
the productivity model are missing at random (MAR).
It is important to realize that basing inference only on the complete cases – still the
standard choice in most empirical papers – would implicitly assume that the data are
missing completely at random (MCAR) which obviously is not the case. To ensure the
MAR-assumption and allow to estimate a sophisticated econometric model with missing
data, we decided to use a multiple imputation procedure. Using a single imputation tech-
nique such as mean imputation, hot deck, or regression imputation, in general results in
confidence intervals and p-values that ignore the uncertainty due to the missing data,
because the imputed data were treated as if they were fixed known values. Thus, basing
standard complete data inference on singly imputed data will typically lead to standard
error estimates that are too small, p-values that are too significant, and confidence inter-
vals that undercover – see, e.g., Ra¨ssler et al. (2003). To correct for these effects using
singly imputed data, special variance estimation techniques have to be applied. For a
recent discussion of the merits and demerits of single and multiple imputation see Groves
et al. (2002).
Notice that the ignorability assumption can never be contradicted by the observed
data. However, Schafer (2001) provides evidence that even the erroneous assumption of
MAR might have only minor impact on estimates and standard errors using a proper
multiple imputation strategy. Only when NMAR is a serious concern, it is obviously
necessary to jointly model the data and the missingness, although such models are based
on other untestable assumptions. Therefore, a multiple imputation procedure seems to
be the best alternative at hand in our situation to account for missingness, to exploit all
valuable information, and to get statistically valid subsequent results based on standard
complete data inference.
4.3 Multiple imputation
Multiple imputation (MI), introduced by Rubin (1978) and discussed in detail in Rubin
(1987), is a Monte Carlo technique replacing missing values by m > 1 simulated versions,
generated according to a probability distribution or, more generally, any density func-
tion indicating how likely imputed values are given the observed data. MI therefore is
an approach that retains the advantages of imputation while allowing the data analyst
to make valid assessments of uncertainty. The concept of multiple imputation reflects
uncertainty in the imputation of the missing values through wider confidence intervals
and larger p-values than under single imputation. Typically m is small, with m = 3 or
m = 5. Each of the imputed and thus completed data sets is first analyzed by standard
methods. Then, the results are combined or pooled to produce estimates and confidence
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intervals that reflect the missing data uncertainty.
The theoretical motivation for multiple imputation is Bayesian. Let Yobs denote the
observed components of any uni- or multivariate variable Y , and Ymis its missing com-
ponents. Basically, MI requires independent random draws from the posterior predictive
distribution
f(ymis|yobs) =
∫
f(ymis, ψ|yobs) dψ =
∫
f(ymis|yobs, ψ) f(ψ|yobs) dψ (14)
of the missing data Ymis given the observed data Yobs with parameter vector ψ. Since
f(ymis|yobs) itself often is difficult to derive, we may alternatively perform
• random draws of the parameters according to their observed-data posterior distri-
bution f(ψ|yobs) as well as
• random draws of the missing data according to their conditional predictive distri-
bution f(ymis|yobs, ψ) given the drawn parameter values.
For many models the conditional predictive distribution f(ymis|yobs, ψ) is rather
straightforward due to the data model used. On the contrary, the corresponding observed-
data posterior
f(ψ|yobs) = L(ψ; yobs) f(ψ)
f(yobs)
(15)
(with the likelihood function L(ψ; yobs) = f(yobs|ψ)) usually is difficult to derive, espe-
cially when the data have a multivariate structure and different, non-monotone missing
data patterns. The observed-data posteriors often are not standard distributions from
which random numbers could easily be generated. Therefore, simpler methods have been
developed to enable multiple imputation on the grounds of Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) techniques. They are extensively discussed by Schafer (1997). Such data aug-
mentation procedures (Tanner and Wong, 1987), which include, for example, Gibbs Sam-
pling, yield a stochastic sequence
{
y
(t)
mis, ψ
(t) : t = 1, 2, . . .
}
whose stationary distribution
is f(ymis, ψ|yobs). More specifically, an iterative sampling scheme is created, as follows.
Given a current guess ψ(t) of the parameter, first draw a value y
(t+1)
mis of the missing
data from the conditional predictive distribution f(ymis|yobs, ψ(t)) . Then, conditioning
on y
(t+1)
mis , draw a new value ψ
(t+1) of ψ from its complete-data posterior f(ψ|yobs, y(t+1)mis ).
Assuming that t is suitably large, m independent draws from such chains can be used as
multiple imputations of Ymis from its posterior predictive distribution f(ymis|yobs).
Based on these m imputed data sets we calculate m complete data statistics θˆ(r) and
their variance estimates Vˆ(θˆ(r)), r = 1, . . . ,m. The complete-case estimates are combined
according to Rubin’s rule such that the MI point estimate θˆMI for parameter θ is the
average
θˆMI =
1
m
m∑
r=1
θˆ(r) (16)
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Its estimated total variance T is calculated according to the analysis of variance principle:
‘between-imputation variance’: B =
1
m− 1
m∑
r=1
(
θˆ(r) − θˆMI
)2
‘within-imputation variance’: W =
1
m
m∑
r=1
Vˆ
(
θˆ(r)
)
(17)
‘total variance’: T = W +
(
1 +
1
m
)
B
For large sample sizes, tests and two-sided interval estimates can be based on the Student’s
t-distribution
θˆMI − θ√
T
·∼ t(v) with v = (m− 1)
(
1 +
W
(1 +m−1)B
)2
(18)
degrees of freedom. For a comprehensive overview of MI see Schafer (1999a).
Multiple imputation is in general applicable when the complete-data estimates are
asymptotically normal or t distributed; e.g., see Rubin and Schenker (1986), Rubin (1987),
Barnard and Rubin (1999), or Little and Rubin (2002). Notice that the usual maximum-
likelihood estimates and their asymptotic variances derived from the inverted Fisher in-
formation matrix typically satisfy these assumptions. In this paper we use ML estimation
for the analyst’s model.
For the creation of the multiple imputations we have used the stand alone software
NORM provided for free by Schafer (1999b). A very detailed description of this data
augmentation algorithm is given by Schafer (1997).
4.4 Data preparation
When using NORM, the data are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution.
Clearly, our survey data are not normally distributed: some are bounded between zero
and one, others are skewed and some have large proportions of zeros; the latter are called
semi-continuous variables (see Schafer and Olsen, 1999). A way to handle non-normality
of the data is by applying suitable transformations (e.g. logit, log or Box-Cox) to the
variables which is done in our application. Moreover, if non-normal variables (such as
discrete or binary ones) are completely observed, then it is quite plausible to still use
the multivariate normal model because incomplete variables are modeled as conditional
normal given a linear function of the complete variables – see, e.g., Schafer (1997). The
variables and their transformations used in our models are listed in the appendix.
Theoretically, we should transform the data to achieve multivariate normality. Practi-
cally, such transformations are not yet available: the usual transformations are performed
on a univariate scale. Investigations show that such deviations from normality (for the
variables to be imputed) should not harm the imputation process too much – see Schafer
(1997) or Gelman et al. (1998). A growing body of evidence supports the claim to use a
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normal model to create multiple imputations even when the observed data are somewhat
non-normal. The focus of the transformations is rather to achieve a range for continuous
variables to be imputed that theoretically have support on the whole real line than to
achieve normality itself. Even for populations that are skewed or heavy-tailed, the ac-
tual coverage of multiple imputation interval estimates is reported to be very close to the
nominal coverage. The multiple imputation framework has been shown to be quite robust
against moderate departures from the data model – see Schafer (1997).
With NORM 2.03, the imputations are created very easily. After a burn-in period of
2000 iterations, every further 200 iterations the imputed data sets are stored. Finally,
m = 5 multiply imputed data sets are used for our analysis. Investigations of time-series
and autocorrelation plots did not suggest any convergence problems. Notice that in the
imputer’s and analyst’s model the same set of input data, i.e., variables and observations,
is used to avoid problems of misspecification – see Meng (1995) or Schafer (2001).
5 Results
5.1 Approaches
The stochastic production frontier (2) with inefficiency sub-model (9) has been estimated
with the IAB German establishment data described in section 3. The production function
follows the translog form in capital and labor and includes further variables given in the
appendix where the variables of the inefficiency sub-model are given as well. As described
in the previous section, 11 regressions have been run for 3 approaches:
• Approach NONR: One regression with only the observed data.
• Approach MIC0: m = 5 auxiliary regressions with the full data set where all missing
values have been filled by multiple imputation (see section 4) but where the zeroes
in the capital variable are maintained.
• Approach MIMI: m = 5 auxiliary regressions with the full data set where all missing
values and the zeroes in the capital variable have been filled by multiple imputation.
Estimation has been performed with LIMDEP 8.0. Tables 3 and 3a provide the results.
In the following, ‘significance’ means ‘significance on the 5 % level’, ‘weak significance’
means ‘significance on the 10 % level’.
5.2 The effects of collective bargaining
The positive influence of collective bargaining on wages and its negative impact on firm
profits are generally accepted among economists. But the effects on productivity and
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efficiency are unclear. In the highly related literature on collective bargaining, unions
(see Freeman and Medoff, 1984) and works councils, some authors stress the positive
influence of unions on productivity due to workers’ higher motivation and satisfaction
leading to higher effort, lower turnover costs and more investment in firm-specific human
capital. Other authors emphasize the reduced flexibility and power of managers leading
to lower productivity. The total effect of collective bargaining on firms’ productivity is
an open empirical question (see e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, p. 424). Studies with
German data mostly seem to have not found any effects (see the survey in Schnabel,
1991).
Indeed, excluding missing observations, the parameter measuring the effect of collec-
tive bargaining on productivity in table 3 is insignificantly positive. But these results rely
on the obviously violated assumption of the data being MCAR. On the other hand, as-
suming the less restrictive MAR assumption and with multiply imputed data, the effect is
significantly negative. With the untransformed frontier (1), the interpretation is straight-
forward. E.g., in the approach with imputed missing values and imputed capital zeroes,
the potential output of an establishment where an industry pay agreement is effective or
which at least aligns its wages to an industry pay agreement is only
exp(−0.0473 · 1) · 100 = 95.8% (19)
of the potential output of an establishment without collective bargaining, ceteris paribus
and on average.
This parameter estimate should be interpreted very cautiously, of course. There might
be no causal relation between collective bargaining and potential output because unionized
workers can have unobserved characteristics different from those of non-unionized ones
leading to selection bias (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, p. 421 and 424, and Gu¨rtzgen,
2006). This heterogeneity problem is certainly aggravated by putting ‘all’ German estab-
lishments into one sample assuming that they have the same technology. Nevertheless,
properly imputing missing data significantly changes the collective bargaining parameter.
The effect on firms’ efficiency is still largely unexplored. In their theoretical analysis,
Addison et al. (2003, p. 3) describe possible positive effects due to lower labor turnover,
lower training costs, and more investment in firm-specific human capital. Particularly,
we do not know of any attempt to analyze this effect with stochastic production frontiers
with the 1-step approach and German establishment data. And international differences
in judicial systems, culture, etc. impede the application of empirical results on the effects
of collective bargaining from one country to the other.
Addison et al. (2003, p. 3) and Schank et al. (2004) – analyzing the effects of works
councils – are exceptions, but they used a fixed-effects panel frontier model, not the
Reifschneider/Stevenson model used in this paper. Hence, apart from providing fixed
individual effects, they did not include inefficiency determinants in their estimation mod-
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els. In their approach, they did not find any significant impact of works councils on firms’
efficiency. This non-result might be caused by their method: They tried to find significant
differences by analyzing the confidence intervals of median plants of subgroups. But Hor-
race and Schmidt (1996) and Jensen (2000) have shown that efficiency differences across
individuals mostly are insignificant when the analysis is based on individual confidence
intervals. Jensen (2000) also provided an alternative by a simple Monte-Carlo procedure,
but, of course, this is still a 2-step approach already been criticized.
Table 3a provides the effects of collective bargaining on firms’ inefficiency. Excluding
missing observations, the parameter is (distinctly) insignificantly positive whereas, with
multiply imputed data, it is significantly (weakly in one case) negative. This means that
– see (4) – an establishment where an industry pay agreement is effective or which at
least aligns its wages to an industry pay agreement is more efficient than an establish-
ment without collective bargaining, ceteris paribus and on average. With (9), one could
interpret the parameter estimates. We do not dare to do this because table 3a shows
that all parameter estimates increase distinctly when based on the multiply imputed data
(compared to the data set with excluded missing observations).
Inefficiency estimates of stochastic production frontiers are well-known to be very
sensitive. Frontier estimates depend on the extreme efficient establishments in the sample,
and the inefficiency estimates are derived from the estimation residuals of these frontiers
– see e.g. Jensen (2005). This problem is even increased in the Reifschneider/Stevenson
model (9) when many variables appear simultaneously in the productivity model and in
the inefficiency sub-model, a very demanding approach (regarding the degrees of freedom)
used in this paper.
Therefore, in table 4, we checked the sensitivity of the inefficiency estimates in the 5
auxiliary regressions with imputed missing values and imputed capital zeroes (u01 - u05),
in the 5 auxiliary regressions with imputed missing values (u1 - u5) and in the regression
with only non-missing values (um). We see that the correlations of these most sensitive
parts of any frontier estimations are very high (see Jensen, 2005) and the performance,
e.g. in the subgroups, is quite reasonable. Furthermore, the large parameter estimates are
quite stable across the m = 5 auxiliary regressions. This means that, although the size of
the parameter estimates in the inefficiency sub-model is not trustworthy, the inefficiency
estimates based on them are well-behaved. Hence, we believe that properly imputing
missing data significantly changes the collective bargaining parameter in the inefficiency
sub-model, too.
What is the reason for the significant effect of multiple imputation on the collective
bargaining parameter in both parts of the model? Recently, many papers have been pub-
lished on the productivity effects of German works councils, a highly related problem.
Addison et al. (2004) survey the literature and report, among others, that some recent
studies like Addison et al. (2003) find considerable sensitivity of the collective bargaining
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parameter estimates to sector, region, and especially to establishment size. Unfortunately,
due to the very demanding approach (see above) used in this paper, we were not able
to conduct a sensible subgroup analysis in this paper. But the results of subsection 4.1
are helpful. There, it has been shown that by ignoring missing data we are systemat-
ically reducing the share of establishments in the sample with smaller size, low degree
of labor utilization, low technical condition, few high-skilled employees, and no industry
pay agreement effects. When there are establishment size effects in the impact of collec-
tive bargaining on firm performance, systematically reducing the share of establishments
in the sample with smaller size by ignoring missing data has a significant influence on
the estimated effects of collective bargaining on the productivity and efficiency of the
establishments in the sample.
As a consequence, it seems to be very dangerous to proceed like most empirical
economists did and do when confronted with missing data (i.e. ignore all the records
with missing values).
5.3 Further controversial results
We begin by comparing the remaining results on the production frontier in table 3. Here,
all 3 approaches perform rather similar – with one important exception. In the MIC0
approach, one labor parameter is insignificant, even with changing signs in the auxiliary
regressions. This certainly is a severe drawback of this approach.
Apart from that, it strikes that higher export activity leads to higher productivity
only when missing observations remain missing whereas, after multiple imputation, the
export parameter becomes insignificantly or weakly significantly negative. See the next
paragraphs for the relation between export activity and efficiency.
More striking differences between the approaches are found in the results on the inef-
ficiency sub-model in table 3a. This is in line with our expectations in the first section
because this part of the model is very sensitive to any kind of misspecification, e.g., due
to wrong assumptions about the missing data mechanism. With multiply imputed data,
• labor has a weakly significantly positive effect on u, i.e., a weakly significantly
negative effect on efficiency – see (4) – whereas, excluding missing observations,
higher wage costs significantly increase efficiency. The negative effect of wages
on efficiency seems more sensible and can be explained by noticing that labor is
proxied by total gross wages and that these total gross wages directly stand for labor
costs, too. So, standard arguments from labor economics, namely shirking theory
(Lazear, 1981), can help to explain the result: Larger firms with many employees
have problems with monitoring the work effort of their employees. A well-known
solution are higher relative wages and the threat of being discharged, a powerful
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disciplinary threat. This can increase productivity but, of course, this might be
inefficient, i.e., too costly.
• higher exports significantly coincide with higher efficiency whereas the relation is
weakly significantly negative with excluded missing observations.
• firms receiving relatively more wage subsidies are significantly less efficient. Employ-
ees receiving wage subsidies might not work efficiently. This effect is only weakly
significant with excluded missing observations.
• firms supporting relatively more on-the-job-training cases are less efficient. This can
make sense because the returns to the firm costs of on-the-job-training might not
be sufficient. This effect is insignificant with excluded missing observations, where
firms supporting the use of PCs for on-the-job-training cases are significantly less
efficient.
• mean technical efficiency – see (4) – is distinctly higher (55 %) than with excluded
missing observations (48 %).
Since we are working with real data and not with simulated data, we don’t know
anything about the true parameter values. Hence, we are not able to say which results
come closer to the truth. Nevertheless, apart from the results on the effects of collective
bargaining, we see particularly in the inefficiency sub-model that working with multiply
imputed data reveals some interesting and plausible results which are not available when
ignoring missing observations. Moreover, with multiply imputed data we account for
the more realistic and less restrictive assumption of the data being missing at random.
Summarizing the performance of the two multiple imputation approaches, the MIC0 ap-
proach suffers from the serious drawback of counterintuitively producing an insignificant
labor parameter in the production function. To conclude, we have a small but distinct
preference for the results obtained with multiple imputation where the capital zeroes are
imputed as well.
5.4 The unanimous results
In this subsection, a larger part of the unanimous and significant results are interpreted.
We start with the results on the production function.
• Except the labor parameter in the MIC0 approach (see the previous subsection),
the capital and labor parameters show the expected signs. Particularly, the t values
for the capital and labor parameter estimates show that the Translog function is a
more sensible choice than the restrictive Cobb-Douglas function.
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• OUTPROGP/OUTPROGN: If turnover is expected to increase (decrease), it seems
to be rather low (high). Thus, an expected increase (decrease) goes in line with
lower (higher) productivity.
• DEVELOP: If the technical condition of a firm is up to date, the productivity is
higher.
• NEWWORK: Firms with relatively many new hires (having little firm-specific hu-
man capital) are less productive.
• SKSEARCH: Firms searching relatively many skilled employees as of now are more
productive.
• FLUCT: Stronger production fluctuations lead to lower productivity.
• EAST: Enterprises which are by majority in East German property are less produc-
tive, a well-known result.
• TRAIND/TRAINPC: Firms supporting on-the-job-training (with or without PCs)
are more productive.
• PROP1: Firms offering many jobs for whom experience is important are less pro-
ductive.
Finally, two stable significant results on the inefficiency sub-model are:
• SKILL: Firms with relatively many skilled employees are producing more efficiently.
• PROP4: Firms offering many jobs for whom creativity is important might be ex-
posed to relatively many production risks leading to lower efficiency.
6 Conclusions
This paper has made three contributions to the literature. First, we have analyzed the ef-
fects of collective bargaining on the productivity and efficiency of German establishments
with the suitable tool, i.e., stochastic production frontiers in the 1-step approach (mod-
eling productivity and efficiency simultaneously). The effect of collective bargaining on
efficiency is mostly ignored. And when efficiency analysis is included (in some papers on
the effects of German works councils), the so-called ‘2-step approach’ has been employed
where the inefficiency estimates from the first step (estimation of productivity with the
frontier) were used to find some inefficiency determinants in a second step.
The second contribution has been to demonstrate the dangers of ignoring missing data
or the gains of properly imputing them when analyzing effects (of collective bargaining)
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on productivity and efficiency. It has been shown that the standard choice in most
empirical economic papers (ignoring missing values) is based on very strong assumptions
about the missing data mechanism. These assumptions are obviously not fulfilled in
our case, as will be the case for many other survey data sets, too. By ignoring missing
data we would have systematically reduced the share of establishments in the sample
with smaller size and no industry pay agreement effects, among others. The results on
the effects of collective bargaining on productivity and efficiency changed after multiple
imputation of the missing values, i.e., after avoiding nonresponse bias, in a plausible way.
Whereas the collective bargaining effect on productivity and efficiency was insignificant
with ignored missing data, it turned out to be significantly negative for productivity
and significantly (weakly in one case) positive for efficiency. Moreover, several additional
parameter estimates, particularly in the very sensitive inefficiency sub-model, changed
significantly and plausibly after multiple imputation.
A third contribution has been the discussion of another important problem in the
estimation of production functions that deserves more attention than it receives: zeroes
in the capital variable proxied by replacement investment. Our suggestion is to multiply
impute these zeroes as well. Of course, our suggestion is based on strong assumptions but
the alternatives are not better:
• The standard choice in most empirical papers (ignoring the observations with capital
zeroes) is based on very strong assumptions about the missing data mechanism.
These assumptions seem not to be fulfilled, thus the standard choice will lead to
even more biased results.
• Taking the average replacement investment of n years also leads to an additional
non-random elimination of observations and, therefore, to an additional nonresponse
bias.
• Using the capital variable with its reported zeroes, i.e. assuming the latent value of
the capital stock to be zero is implausible and turned out to be problematic due to
an insignificant estimate of the labor parameter.
We conclude that the literature on the effects of collective bargaining – and works
councils, too – on firm performance would gain distinctly from adopting recent develop-
ments in the frontier literature as well as from properly checking their implicit assumptions
about the missing data mechanisms, thus, working with (multiply) imputed data.
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Appendix: Data preparation, variable construction
Variables in the questionnaire (to be transformed)
SALE turnover in EUR
INPUT input of materials, goods and services in % of turnover
INVEST investment in EUR
ADDINV investment to enlarge capital in % of investment
EMP total number of employees
NOVERTIM total number of employees with paid overtime in previous year
EXPORT export in EUR
NSKILL total number of highly skilled employees
NTEMP total number of temporary employees
NONEWHIR dummy: NONEWHIR = 1 if no new hires in first half-year
WOULD dummy: WOULD = 1 if employer wanted to hire new employees
NNEWHIR total number of new hires in first half-year
QUIT total number of quits in first half-year
NTERMIN total number of terminations by employees in first half-year
NSEARC total number of employees searched as of now
NSKSEARC total number of skilled employees searched as of now
NSUBSIDL total number of employees supported by wage subsidies in previous year
NSHORT total number of short-time workers in first half-year
NTRAINP total number of employees in on-the-job-training in first half-year
NTRAINC total number of on-the-job-training cases in first half-year
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Variables in the regressions
MISS dummy: MISS = 1 if item-nonresponse occurs
MISS0 dummy: MISS0 = 1 if item-nonresponse occurs or if C is zero
Y output: SALE * (1 - INPUT/100)
C capital: INVEST * (1 - ADDINV/100), C = 1 if no investment
L labor: total gross monthly wages in June
YEAR dummy: YEAR = 1 if observation in 2003
OVERTIM NOVERTIM/EMP
OUTPROGP dummy: OUTPROGP = 1 if turnover is expected to increase
OUTPROGN dummy: OUTPROGN = 1 if turnover is expected to decrease
EXP EXPORT/SALE
DEVELOP ordinal: Rating of technical condition of enterprise
(0 = completely out-of-date, 4 = up to date)
COLLECT dummy: COLLECT = 1 for collective agreements
SKILL NSKILL/EMP
TEMP NTEMP/EMP
NOLABSUP dummy: NOLABSUP = NONEWHIR * WOULD
NEWWORK NNEWHIR/EMP
TERMIN NTERMIN/QUIT
SEARCH NSEARC/EMP
SKSEARCH NSKSEARC/EMP
SUBSIDYL NSUBSIDL/EMP
FLUCT dummy: FLUCT = 1 for stronger production fluctuations in previous year
EAST dummy: EAST = 1 if enterprise by majority in East German ownership
PUBLIC dummy: PUBLIC = 1 if enterprise by majority in public ownership
SHORTTIM NSHORT/EMP
TRAIND dummy: TRAIND = 1 if employer has supported on-the-job-training in first half-year
TRAINPER NTRAINP/EMP
TRAINCAS NTRAINC/EMP
TRAINPC dummy: TRAINPC = 1 if employer supports use of PCs for on-the-job-training
TYPE1 dummy: TYPE1 = 1 for independent enterprise without any establishments elsewhere
TYPE2 dummy: TYPE2 = 1 for head office of an enterprise with establishments elsewhere
TYPE3 dummy: TYPE3 = 1 for branch establishment of a larger enterprise
TYPE4 dummy: TYPE4 = 1 for intermediate authority of a larger enterprise
PROP1 dummy: PROP1 = 1 if experience is important for most jobs in the firm
PROP2 dummy: PROP2 = 1 if physical endurance is important for most jobs in the firm
PROP4 dummy: PROP4 = 1 if creativity is important for most jobs in the firm
PROP5 dummy: PROP5 = 1 if discipline is important for most jobs in the firm
PROP6 dummy: PROP6 = 1 if flexibility is important for most jobs in the firm
PROP8 dummy: PROP8 = 1 if superior workmanship is important for most jobs in the firm
PROP9 dummy: PROP9 = 1 if theoretical knowledge is important for most jobs in the firm
PROP11 dummy: PROP11 = 1 if loyalty is important for most jobs in the firm
PROP12 dummy: PROP12 = 1 if willingness to learn is important for most jobs in the firm
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Data transformation for MI procedure
Y Box-Cox
C log, dummy∗
L Box-Cox
OVERTIM logit
EXP log, dummy∗
DEVELOP no transformation
SKILL logit
NEWWORK Box-Cox
TERMIN logit
SKSEARCH Box-Cox
SUBSIDYL Box-Cox
SHORTTIM Box-Cox
TRAINPER Box-Cox
TRAINCAS Box-Cox
1. Variables marked with an asterisk are treated as semi-continuous, i.e., a major part
of the observations are at the minimum or the maximum of values. Therefore, we
defined dummy variables that indicate whether an observation is at the respective
minimum or maximum. The transformation procedure is performed only for the
continuous part of the variable (see subsection 4.4).
2. All variables not mentioned in this list are dummies which remain untransformed
(see subsection 4.4).
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Tables
Table 1: Variables with the highest nonresponse (in %)
Variable 2002 2003
Turnover 13.69 15.05
Input of materials, goods and services 11.99 12.67
Total gross monthly wages in June 11.07 12.78
Investment to enlarge capital 8.38 6.92
Investment 4.19 4.51
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Table 2: Estimates of Probit Model for item-nonresponse
Endogenous var. → MISS MISS0
Exogenous var. ↓ Marg. effect t value Marg. effect t value
Const. 0.0876 2.97 0.1366 3.22
ln(EMP ) -0.0195 -5.44 -0.0182 -3.09
YEAR 0.0211 2.99 0.0085 2.54
OVERTIM -0.0003 -2.15 -0.0002 -2.78
OUTPROGP -0.0419 -7.83 -0.0127 -4.96
OUTPROGN -0.0214 -3.82 -0.0023 -1.32
DEVELOP -0.0011 -3.08 -0.0076 -3.10
COLLECT -0.0390 -4.48 -0.0067 -2.27
SKILL -0.1526 -6.41 -0.0179 -2.64
TEMP 0.0134 1.37
NEWWORK 0.0359 1.35
TERMIN -0.0012 -1.59 -0.0004 -1.14
SEARCH 0.0554 1.52
SUBSIDYL -0.0663 -2.28
FLUCT -0.0347 -4.00 -0.0105 -2.58
EAST -0.0847 -6.28 0.0054 1.82
PUBLIC -0.0176 -1.65
TRAIND -0.0257 -2.93
TRAINPER 0.0001 3.28
TRAINPC -0.0107 -2.51
Property dummies yes yes
Type dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
18447 observations 18447 observations
Source: own calculations, based on IAB data
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Table 3: Estimates of stochastic production frontier
Imputed missing values, Imputed missing values, Non-missing values
imputed capital zeroes with capital zeroes
Variable Coefficient t value Coefficient t value Coeff. t value
Const. 7.8103 30.52 9.3327 28.72 8.6089 73.44
ln(C) 0.1541 3.19 0.0253 3.44 0.0227 3.78
ln(L) 0.1144 2.70 0.0125 0.46 0.1721 7.38
(ln(C))2 0.0115 3.25 0.0070 13.37 0.0064 16.54
(ln(L))2 0.0486 17.70 0.0399 27.79 0.0317 25.64
ln(C) · ln(L) -0.0309 -4.08 -0.0088 -11.15 -0.0079 -12.63
YEAR -0.0386 -1.34 -0.0026 -0.19 0.0136 1.21
OVERTIM -0.0453 -1.44 -0.0382 -1.23 0.0292 1.34
OUTPROGP -0.0508 -2.54 -0.0517 -2.69 -0.0565 -3.55
OUTPROGN 0.0678 4.52 0.0701 4.59 0.0852 6.73
EXP -0.0750 -1.34 -0.0999 -1.79 0.0781 5.39
DEVELOP 0.0708 4.02 0.0640 4.65 0.0567 5.13
COLLECT -0.0473 -2.02 -0.0606 -2.36 0.0126 0.64
NEWWORK -0.4025 -6.60 -0.4282 -7.63 -0.5289 -11.64
SKSEARCH 0.2057 2.31 0.1956 2.21 0.1725 3.42
FLUCT -0.0436 -2.11 -0.0471 -2.27 -0.0411 -2.56
TYPE2 0.1652 4.77 0.1646 5.02 0.0783 3.14
TYPE3 0.3810 12.01 0.3922 13.21 0.3203 14.44
TYPE4 0.4094 5.80 0.4197 5.91 0.3707 7.35
EAST -0.1681 -7.00 -0.1695 -7.11 -0.1657 -8.35
TRAIND 0.0662 3.08 0.0551 2.30 0.0682 3.61
TRAINPER -0.0081 -1.79 -0.0117 -2.60 -0.0059 -1.20
TRAINPC 0.0796 3.63 0.0770 3.54 0.0766 4.38
PROP1 -0.0587 -2.69 -0.0614 -2.89 -0.0557 -3.41
PROP2 -0.0396 -2.08 -0.0317 -1.69 -0.0703 -5.40
PROP5 0.0412 1.96 0.0441 2.09 0.0458 3.05
PROP6 0.0362 1.62 0.0373 1.74 0.0238 1.38
PROP8 -0.0651 -2.95 -0.0651 -2.91 -0.0548 -2.83
PROP9 -0.0700 -3.85 -0.0726 -3.98 -0.0529 -3.65
PROP11 0.0470 2.69 0.0381 2.10 0.0511 3.81
PROP12 0.0416 2.29 0.0385 2.12 0.0444 3.29
Industry dummies yes yes yes
18447 observations 18447 observations 13969 observations
Source: own calculations, based on IAB data
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Table 3a: Estimates of inefficiency submodel
Imputed missing values, Imputed missing values, Non-missing values
imputed capital zeroes with capital zeroes
Variable Coefficient t value Coefficient t value Coeff. t value
Const. -32.816 -2.15 -29.564 -2.30 -0.1646 -0.41
ln(L) 0.809 1.61 0.793 1.77 -0.0874 -2.90
EXP -32.826 -2.74 -31.184 -2.99 0.0633 1.71
DEVELOP 1.039 1.30 0.708 1.03 0.1195 1.82
COLLECT -3.100 -1.85 -3.407 -2.14 0.0148 0.12
SKILL -5.615 -2.11 -4.750 -2.28 -0.3442 -2.62
NOLABSUP 4.066 1.53 3.745 1.59 0.0907 0.48
TERMIN -4.482 -1.74 -4.599 -1.83 -0.2006 -1.64
SUBSIDYL 6.064 2.46 5.599 2.71 0.2723 1.84
FLUCT -2.667 -1.61 -2.313 -1.64 -0.1489 -1.55
TYPE1 -7.468 -2.58 -6.533 -2.76 -0.5958 -5.15
EAST -2.135 -1.28 -2.174 -1.40 -0.2946 -2.48
SHORTTIM -4.841 -1.17 -5.279 -1.40 -0.0541 -0.22
TRAIND -1.671 -1.11 -1.698 -1.26 0.1614 1.37
TRAINCAS 0.207 2.72 0.202 3.07 0.0121 1.46
TRAINPC 1.721 1.22 1.797 1.27 0.2222 2.08
PROP1 -1.766 -1.25 -1.945 -1.48 -0.1842 -1.84
PROP4 4.423 2.22 4.042 2.46 0.4545 5.38
PROP6 2.876 1.62 2.422 1.63 0.1528 1.44
PROP8 -4.468 -1.38 -4.003 -1.55 -0.2531 -2.21
Industry dummies yes yes yes
λ 6.428 2.88 6.024 3.21 2.6818 26.78
Technical inefficiency estimates
Variable Mean Mean Mean
ui 0.5924 0.5908 0.7433
18447 observations 18447 observations 13969 observations
Source: own calculations, based on IAB data
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Table 4: Correlation of inefficiency estimates
u01 u02 u03 u04 u05 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 um
u01 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.984 0.985 0.987 0.980 0.983 0.960
u02 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.984 0.986 0.987 0.981 0.984 0.962
u03 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.998 0.999 0.984 0.985 0.988 0.980 0.983 0.959
u04 0.998 0.999 0.998 1.000 0.998 0.984 0.985 0.986 0.982 0.983 0.965
u05 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 1.000 0.984 0.985 0.987 0.980 0.984 0.962
u1 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 1.000 0.985 0.982 0.984 0.986 0.946
u2 0.985 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 1.000 0.982 0.984 0.985 0.948
u3 0.987 0.987 0.988 0.986 0.987 0.982 0.982 1.000 0.978 0.981 0.948
u4 0.980 0.981 0.980 0.982 0.980 0.984 0.984 0.978 1.000 0.987 0.949
u5 0.983 0.984 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.986 0.985 0.981 0.987 1.000 0.949
um 0.960 0.962 0.959 0.965 0.962 0.946 0.948 0.948 0.949 0.949 1.000
Source: own calculations, based on IAB data
u01 - u05 from 5 auxiliary regressions with imputed missing values and imputed capital zeroes
u1 - u5 from 5 auxiliary regressions with imputed missing values
um from regression with non-missing values
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